

Message Text

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PAGE 01 SECTO 03020 281746Z
ACTION SS-25

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTO 03020

EXDIS

FOR NYE FROM HARTMAN

DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PARM, MNWC, IAEA, BR, GW
SUBJECT: SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD FRG/BRAZIL NUCLEAR DEAL

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN STATE COMMITTEE FOR
ATOMIC ENERGY MOROKHOV CONFIRMED SOVIETS HAVE NOT
APPROACHED BRAZIL RE FRG NUCLEAR DEAL ALONG LINES OF
THEIR DIPLOMATIC NOTE TO FRG. STRESSING SOVIET POSITION
ON STRICT CONTROL OF FULL CYCLE, HE WAS ALMOST 100 PERCENT
SURE SOVIETS WOULD REFUSE ANY BRAZILIAN APPROACH SHOULD
FRG NUCLEAR CONTRACT BE DEFERRED. END SUMMARY.

2. ASST. SECRETARY HARTMAN AND PROFESSOR
MARSHALL SHULMAN CALLED ON I. D. MOROKHOV, DEPUTY
CHAIRMAN STATE COMMITTEE FOR UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY,
MARCH 28. CONVEYING BEST WISHES OF JOSEPH NYE,
HARTMAN MADE FOLLOWING POINTS RE FRG/BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR
POWER DEAL:
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PAGE 02 SECTO 03020 281746Z

(A) WE ARE PURSUING WITH FRG AND BRAZIL OUR
PROPOSAL THAT THE ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING ELEMENTS
OF THEIR NUCLEAR REACTOR CONTRACT BE DEFERRED INDEFIN-
ITELY IN THE INTEREST OF AVOIDING PROLIFERATION RISKS.
WE APPRECIATE RECEIVING A COPY OF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC NOTE
TO THE FRG AND HAVE READ IT CAREFULLY. HAVE SOVIETS

ALSO APPROACHED BRAZIL?

(B) A KEY ELEMENT OF OUR APPROACH IS THAT WE SEEK NEITHER ABROGATION OF THE NUCWTO ACCORD NOR COMMERCIAL DISADVANTAGE FOR THE FRG AND BRAZIL. THIS MEANS THAT THE REACTOR AND FUEL CONTRACTS WOULD REMAIN UNIMPAIRED. WE WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION THAT SOVIET GOVERNMENT AGREES WITH THIS APPROACH.

(C) THE BRAZILIANS HAVE ASKED FOR OUR PROPOSALS IN WRITING AND ARE STUDYING THEM; WE BELIEVE HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD BRING HOME TO THE BRAZILIANS THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR PROPOSALS IF THE URENCO FUEL SUPPLY CONTRACTS FOR THEIR ANGRA 2 AND 3 REACTORS ARE ALLOWED TO LAPSE

(B) IN ADDITION TO OUR ASSURING THE GERMANS AND BRAZILIANS THAT WE WOULD NOT TAKE COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGE OF MODIFICATION IN THE NUCLEAR CONTRACT, WE HAVE TOLD THE DUTCH, FRG, AND UK URENCO PARTNERS WE WOULD NOT DISPLACE THEIR NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY TO BRAZIL.

(E) WE KNOW FROM THE URENCO PARTNERS THAT A SIMILAR ASSURANCE FROM THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ASSIST THEM IN THEIR DECISION TO DELAY RENEWAL. AS THIS COULD HAVE A KEY TACTICAL EFFECT ON BRAZILIAN RECEPTIVITY TO THE U.S. PROPOSALS, WE WOULD BE MOST APPRECIATIVE OF ASSURANCES THAT SOVIETS WOULD NOT SEEK COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGE AS A RESULT OF ANY CHANGE IN NUCLEAR SUPPLY ARRANGEMENTS WITH BRAZIL RESULTING FROM OUR NON-CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 SECTO 03020 281746Z

PROLIFERATION EFFORTS.

3. REPLYING TO POINT (A), MOROKHOV CONFIRMED THAT SOVIETS HAVE NOT APPROACHED BRAZIL, WITH WHOM THEY HAVE NO NUCLEAR AGREEMENT. SOVIET PRESENTATION WAS MADE SOLELY TO FRG AS SUPPLIER, NPT ADHERENT AND LONDON CLUB MEMBER.

4. ON POINTS (B) AND (E), MOROKHOV SAID HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO SPEAK OFFICIALLY, BUT AS FAR BACK AS DECEMBER 1974 SOVIETS HAD ADVOCATED COMPLETE CONTROL OF FULL CYCLE. A LONG TIME AGO BRAZIL HAD APPROACHED USSR RE URANIUM ENRICHMENT BUT THE DEAL FAILED TO MATERIALIZE BECAUSE OF THIS FIRM SOVIET POSITION. IN RECENT PAST, BRAZIL HAD MADE NO OFFICIAL REQUEST AND NONE WAS FORESEEN. MOROKHOV WAS "ABOUT 100 PERCENT" CERTAIN THAT IF BRAZIL SHOULD MAKE SUCH A REQUEST THE ANSWER WOULD BE NEGATIVE BECAUSE THE USSR WOULD NOT DEPART FROM ITS PRINCIPLES.

5. IN CLOSING, MOROKHOV SAID HE LOOKED FORWARD TO
MEETING NYE FOR CONSULTATIONS AT THE END OF APRIL.

6. SEPARATE MEMCON ON OTHER SUBJECTS FOLLOWS.
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